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RESULTS MATERIAL AND METHODS 
This bibliographical review explores the administrative, ethic and social 
aspects of the Toxic Oil Syndrome. Because the actions were taken on 
the basis of epidemiologic information, a focus is taken upon some 
aspects of the development of the epidemic. On the other hand, there is 
some interest met on the toxicological and on the clinical aspects, as a 
kind of introduction, to explain the initial confusion about the etiological 
agent and the effects of the disease on the sick. 
 
This work is based on some international publications, mostly by the 
WHO (World Health's Organization). Both Toxic Oil reports (1992 and 
2004) are being used as a start point for relevant essays, especially on 
the first parts: the clinical, chemical and epidemiological aspects. 
As for the last part, less “formal” or scientific information is available, 
as global risk assessment is rarely taken into account as a whole. 
Especially when it comes to comparison, I have tried to find some kind 
of guide or layout to emergency management. Luckily, the WHO 
published on February 1981 (four months prior the outbreak) a 
“Planning emergency response systems for chemical accidents” (Jones 
1981). On the same book there are evidences that the Spain Health 
Ministry knew of it. 
On a general basis, I have tried to compare the actions or the attitudes 
taken with available guides or information available at the time. Where 
it was not possible, I have taken some present layouts and interpreted 
the past situation with them (as with the communication groups, 
Gervas 2009). 
 
 
 
On the 1st of May a child died in the Niño Jesús Hospital, in Madrid. He had a new disease, never seen before on the medical bibliography. A month later, his 
doctor ventured a cause for the disease: adulterated, unlabeled street oil, sold by itinerant vendors. Beginning that day, Spain lived the worst food-born 
epidemic in its entire history. 
For many years, the specific etymological agent remained unknown and the animal models gave no results in simulating the disease. Even more, at the time 
of the epidemics little was known about the origin of the oil, nor was it certain that the epidemic was caused by the oil. An action had to be taken, but solely 
scarce epidemiological information was available. This project will try to review the administrative actions as well as the social and ethical consequences 
derived from them. 
DISCUSION 
-Clinical: the Toxic Oil Syndrome was a multisystemic disease, with three 
distinct phases: acute, intermediate and chronic, each with some common 
traits and some distinctive features (Phillien 1993).  
Death risk was present in each of the phases. 
-Chemstry: despite being the first obvious hipotesis, the aniline-
denaturant present in the street oil has lost its status as the main target 
molecule by a candidate with a much better case-dose corealtion : the 3-
(N-phenylamino)-1,2-propanediol and their esters (Hill et al.,1995). 
-Epidemiology: the oil came from France, were it was sold as edible oil. 
Prior entering Spain, it was denatured with 2% aniline. Here, RAELCA 
bougth the oil by means of RAPSA, and “renatured” it on the ITH refinery 
in Seville (Hill et al., 1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As early as 23 April, people became to get sick, and on 10th of June the 
Goverment made an official declaration relating the new disease with the 
oil consumption. The 30th of June the Goverment proceed to exchange the 
house-hold oil with pure olive oil, at the State expense. The situation 
improved quickly, althoug the epidemic curve started to decai some days 
earlier (Posada et al., 2001). 
The response to the epidemic was very precipitated and spontaneous, 
although some points can be remarked: 
-There was no plan, nor were there any intentions to prepare one, for an 
outbreak such as this or of any kind. 
-Comunication between parties (government, scientist and the public) was 
deficient and created more confusion than it intended to reduce. 
-Social issues are quickly forgotten, it seems it's victim's responsibility to 
keep them on the dairy political schedual. 
-The Toxic Oil Syndrome served as a sort of catalisys to improve and 
regenerate the Spanish Public Health system, as well as to make the 
European Union realise that a new path for new deseases was possible: 
food. 
